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Abstract
We develop a dynamic multi-dimensional signaling model of campaign ﬁnance in which
candidates can signal their ability by enacting policy and/or raising and spending campaign
funds, both of which are costly. Our model departs from the existing literature in that
candidates do not need to exchange policy inﬂuence for campaign contributions, rather, they
must decide how to allocate their eﬀorts between policymaking and fundraising. If high-
ability candidates are better policymakers and fundraisers then they will raise and spend
campaign funds even if voters care only about legislation. Voters’ inability to reward or
punish politicians based on past policy allows fundraising to be used to signal quality at the
expense of voter welfare. Campaign ﬁnance reform alleviates this phenomenon and improves
voter welfare at the expense of high-ability politicians. Thus, we expect successful politicians
to oppose true campaign ﬁnance reform. We also show our model is consistent with ﬁndings
in the empirical and theoretical campaign ﬁnance literature.
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1 Introduction
Proponents of campaign ﬁnance reform claim that campaign contributions corrupt politicians and
bias policy. While conventional wisdom suggests the existence of such an eﬀect, there is a dearth
of systematic evidence. This absence is not due to a lack of study. If one examines all of the
arguments in favor of restricting campaign contributions closely, a less ﬂashy and more defensible
criticism emerges: raising campaign funds corrupts the time allocation of politicians. They spend
too much time raising money and too little time governing. In this paper we explain how this
ineﬃciency persists, and demonstrate how reform would alleviate it.
Most of the academic literature in economics and political science agrees with proponents of
campaign ﬁnance reform. In this literature it is assumed that “parties bias their policy choices
to attract money from interest groups and then use this money to attract the votes of the unin-
formed.”2 Recent empirical work calls both of these assumptions into question. Ansolabehere et
al. (2003) argue that campaign contributions appear to have no eﬀect on legislative behavior. Ad-
ditionally, if advertising is informative enough to justify the money spent on it, we should expect
that changing levels of advertising would have profound eﬀects on the outcomes of elections. This
too lacks empirical support (Levitt, 1994).
It is clear, however, that the pursuit of campaign contributions biases the allocation of politi-
cians’ time, attention, and eﬀort. We incorporate this bias in eﬀort into a dynamic signaling model
that does not rely on vote buying and the accompanying biases in policy. In every election cycle
1Taken from:
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial opinion/oped/articles/2006/03/10/limit campaign fund raising/
2Quoter from Coate (2004a). For models of this type see: Baron (1989), Snyder (1990), Prat (2002) and Coate
(2004a). Prat (2006) and Coate (2004b) make a distinction between service-induced contributions, which are
deﬁned as above, and position-induced contributions, where contributions are given based on past voting records.
For the purposes of this discussion the two are observationally equivalent. Funds increase the chance of (re-)election
and candidates must take a certain position to obtain them. For a complete theoretical treatment of this point see
Fox (2007).
1politicians exert eﬀort toward implementing policy and toward raising and spending campaign
funds.3 These activities are costly to politicians. If high-ability candidates are better policymak-
ers and better fundraisers, they can use these activities to signal their privately known ability.4
A high-ability politician wants to signal her type at minimum cost. When the marginal costs of
each of these activities are increasing, it will generally be cheaper to signal through both channels
than to signal through only one.
Voters cast their ballots based solely on the expected quality of candidates’ future policies.5
Voters are not fooled or bought by campaign expenditures, nor do they have preferences for any
innate characteristics a politician may posses. Why then are candidates concerned with signaling
their ability? The answer follows directly from the dynamic structure of the repeated election
setup. Every period high-ability politicians will signal their ability through implementing better
policy (and raising more funds) than low-ability politicians. Therefore, voters prefer to have
high-ability politicians in oﬃce.6
A rational electorate must base their decisions only on future expectations, so voters cannot
commit to ignoring fundraising or to rewarding politicians for past policies. Because voters cannot
commit to incentive contracts with their elected oﬃcials, politicians continue to signal through
fundraising, though voters would prefer they signaled solely through making better policy.
Limiting campaign expenditures forces candidates to expend less eﬀort on signaling through the
raising and spending of campaign funds. In order to preserve separation in equilibrium, this eﬀort
(and more) will be expended on making higher quality policy, which will increase voter welfare.
While previous models also predict that campaign ﬁnance reform would increase voter welfare,
3Our model is theoretically similar to the one-shot, multi-dimensional signaling models of Wilson (1985) and
Milgrom and Roberts (1986), and could be easily extended to incorporate any number of signaling channels.
4Prat et al. (2005) ﬁnd that higher quality legislators receive more campaign contributions. Although not
explicitly stated this way, other recent models of campaign ﬁnance, such as Prat (2006) and Coate (2004b), implicitly
assume that higher quality legislators are better fundraisers.
5Adding heterogeneous policy positions does not aﬀect the results as long as the standard conditions are met for
platforms to converge to the ideal point of the median voter (Hotelling, 1929; Downs, 1957). In order to focus on
the eﬀort allocation decision of politicians, we assume quality of policy is single dimensional and all voters prefer
higher quality.
6This feature is unique within models with oﬃce motivated candidates, and provides a foundation for candidate
valence in one-period games. Valence is deﬁned as the direct utility that a voter gets from having a high-ability
politician in oﬃce. For a foundation of valence when candidates can also be policy-motivated, see Callander (2005).
2these predictions follow directly from the assumption that campaign funds inﬂuence policy.
One might ask, “If the literature is so sure that campaign ﬁnance reform would increase voter
welfare, why has campaign funding grown at the same rate as GDP over the last 100 years?” Our
model provides an answer to this question as well: campaign ﬁnance reform makes incumbent
politicians worse oﬀ. Thus, we would not expect them to enact legislation that would curtail
campaign spending.7
In addition, our model encapsulates many ﬁndings from a diverse set of theoretical and em-
pirical work. Incumbents are more likely to win than their challengers. This is due to a selection
eﬀect already identiﬁed in the literature. We also predict that high-ability challengers may be
deterred by incumbents’ high fundraising in the previous period.
Finally, in vote buying models campaign spending has two opposing eﬀects on voter welfare.
Spending plays an informational role by helping voters decipher which politicians will be best if
elected. This is good for voter welfare. However, spending also entails that policy choice is biased
away from the preferences of the electorate. This is bad for voter welfare, and thus, there is a
tradeoﬀ. In our model we eliminate this tradeoﬀ by retaining only the informational role. Yet,
even though campaign contributions do not buy policy inﬂuence, we ﬁnd that limiting campaign
spending enhances voter welfare by shifting politicians’ eﬀorts from fundraising to governing.
2 The Model
We model a repeated election process. There are time periods t = 1,2,3... where an election is
held at the beginning of each period t ≥ 2. The players are voters and two candidates in each
election: the incumbent and the challenger. The candidate who wins the election in period t − 1
is the incumbent in period t, and the candidate who loses never runs again. Each period, each
candidate has privately known ability (or type), θt
i, which can be either low or high, θt
i ∈ {L,H}.
7While campaign ﬁnance legislation is a hot topic, we note that 13 major campaign ﬁnance bills have been
passed since 1867, and yet campaign spending has risen ten times faster than inﬂation and on par with GDP
(Ansolabehere et al., 2003, p. 120). Note that there have been large swings in the per GDP level of spending, but
long-term decreases are generally not preceded by the adoption of campaign ﬁnance laws. Indeed, it often seems
to be the other way around.
3The probability of candidate i being type H is pt
i ∈ (0,1), which is common knowledge among all
players. Challengers are high types with probability p, as are incumbents who were low types in
the previous period. The probability that an incumbent who was a high type in the last period is
a high type again is p ≥ p.8 The substantive reason for these switching probabilities is that things
change. As time progresses, political circumstances alter and certain politicians may no longer be
as eﬀective as they once were. Others may become more eﬀective.9
The actions available to voters are voting for the incumbent or challenger in a given election.
The actions available to a candidate each period are putting eﬀort into increasing the quality of
policy, qt ∈ Q ⊂ R+, and/or putting eﬀort into raising and spending funds, ft ∈ F ⊂ R+.10 That
is, in each period, a candidate may choose any pair (qt,ft) ∈ Q × F ⊂ R2
+. These activities are
costly, but more costly for a low type. Denote c(q,f|θ) as the cost function for a candidate of type
θ taking actions q and f. We assume:
Assumption 1 For each θ c(q,f|θ) is continuous, convex, and strictly increasing. Additionally
c(0,0|θ) = 0, and for all c ∈ R+ there exists q(c,θ) and f(c,θ) such that c(q(c,θ),0|θ) = c =
c(0,f(c,θ)|θ).
Assumption 2 −c(q,f|θ) satisﬁes strict increasing diﬀerences in (q,f) and θ. That is, for all
(q0,f0) ≥ (q,f), (q0,f0) 6= (q,f): c(q0,f0|H) − c(q,f|H) < c(q0,f0|L) − c(q,f|L).
The ﬁrst assumption implies that isocost curves for both types are continuous curves inter-
secting both axes with convex lower contour sets (the set of points that are no more costly than
the points on the isocost curve). The second assumption states that any increase in the quality of
8The model can be extended to encompass more complex switching processes, or a wider array of potential
challengers. The ideas will be precisely the same, but the algebra more cumbersome and less transparent.
9It may appear that without switching probabilities a candidate could convince voters that she was a high type
in the ﬁrst period and not need to signal thereafter. However, recent work by Kaya (2006) shows that this is not
necessarily true. She constructs an equilibrium where a sender signals each period even though the receiver puts
probability one on the sender being a high type. This equilibrium satisﬁes our equilibrium concept. Still, we ﬁnd
it both substantively accurate and easier to conceptualize the dynamics when p and p are both in (0,1).
10Challengers are assumed to hold other political oﬃces prior to the election. In Section 5, we comment on what
happens if this does not hold. Our welfare analysis does not rely on this assumption. If only incumbents signal
through policymaking all welfare claims still hold.
4policy (q) and/or fundraising (f) costs a low type incrementally more than a high type.11 Together
these assumptions imply that for a given cost, c > 0, a high type’s isocost curve at that level lies
everywhere above a low type’s isocost curve for the same level.12
Candidates value winning oﬃce and minimizing their cost of doing so. The per-period value
of being in oﬃce is common among all candidates, and normalized to 1. Voters receive utility
from higher quality policy, q, which is directly observable. The per-period utility of a candidate
(ut) who selects policy and fundraising levels (qt,ft) and voters (vt) for having policy qt and a













All candidates have a common discount factor δ ≤ 1. Each individual voter can have any positive
discount factor. We deﬁne our equilibrium concept as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 We use the term equilibrium to mean a sequential equilibrium that satisﬁes se-
quential elimination of weakly dominated strategies and the intuitive criterion.13
We restrict the number of equilibria by assuming throughout that when voters are indiﬀerent
between electing either candidate, each is equally likely to win. We focus on symmetric Markov
Perfect equilibria, so a pure strategy is a map from a candidate’s type into an action.14 An
equilibrium is symmetric if all candidates use the same strategy.
Denote πθ (pi) as a candidate’s probability of winning an election if types will be revealed, given
that her type is θ and her opponent has probability pi of being a high type. Let xθ be a candidate
11Nothing would be changed if the eﬀorts of a high-type are also more productive. Assumption 2 is not a
necessary condition for positive fundraising in equilibrium. Without Assumption 2 positive fundraising can exist
in equilibrium even if both types ﬁnd fundraising equally costly.
12The model can easily be extended to accommodate any ﬁnite number of types since Assumption 2 guarantees
that cost functions are such that each type only needs to worry about preventing imitation by the type immediately
below it.
13This equilibrium concept is suggested by Milgrom and Roberts (1986). Sequential equilibrium is from Kreps
and Wilson (1982) and the intuitive criterion is from Cho and Kreps (1987).
14In richer election settings the probability distribution on an opponents’ type can be payoﬀ relevant.
5of type θ’s gain from being perceived as a high type, rather than a low type, which is just the
increase in the probability of being elected times the value of being in oﬃce. The value of being
in oﬃce, η(θ), is both the immediate reward, 1, and the possibility of being re-elected:
xθ = (πH − πL)η(θ) = (πH − πL)(1 + ρ(θ)) (1)
where ρ(θ) represents the present-discounted value of the ﬂow of beneﬁts from the possibility of
being re-elected, which is dependent on θ.15 High types are more likely to remain high types
(p ≤ p), and we will show high types are more likely to be elected, therefore ρ(H) ≥ ρ(L), and
xH ≥ xL.
Before investigating our repeated elections model, it is useful to study a simpler, one-shot
game. Much of the intuition, central themes and analysis will easily carry over from the one-shot
to the repeated game.
3 A Single Election Model
In our single election model there are two periods, t ∈ {1,2}. The incumbent holds oﬃce in
period 1. An election is held at the beginning of period 2, with the winner holding oﬃce for the
remainder of the game. The actions available to candidates and their per-period cost functions
and utility functions are the same as in the repeated election model. We alter voter’s preferences
so they now receive utility from both higher quality policy, which is directly observable, and from
having a high-ability leader. We will see in the repeated elections model that high types will oﬀer
higher quality policies than low types in subsequent periods. The direct beneﬁt to voters of a high
type is meant to approximate this phenomenon in the single election context. Voters now have




t) = I{θt=H} + q
t
15For a stationary equilibrium it is only necessary to ensure that no type can proﬁt from a one step deviation.
This is why ρ(θ) is the proper component in xθ.
6In a two-period game the equilibrium strategies in the second period are simple: whoever was
elected will not enact policy in the second period (q2 = 0), since it is costly and the world ends
immediately after. In the second period, voters obtain v2(θ2,0) = I{θ2=H}. The voters’ objective
is thus to select the candidate more likely to be a high type after the election. Since p ≥ p, voters
will elect the candidate shown to be more likely to be a high type in the ﬁrst period. We now
analyze the ﬁrst period, omitting the time superscripts, and refer to the ﬁrst period of the single
election model as the one-shot game. Referring to equation (1), note in the one-shot game with
two candidates πH(pi) = (1−pi)+
pi
2 , πL(pi) =
(1−pi)
2 and η = 1. Thus, xθ, the gain to a candidate
of type θ from being perceived as a high type, is equal to 1
2 for all pi ∈ (0,1) and all θ ∈ {L,H}.
We show that a symmetric separating equilibrium always exists, and characterize its proper-
ties.16 Further, we show that all equilibria must be separating, and ﬁnd conditions under which
there exists a unique equilibrium.
3.1 No Campaign Finance Reform
Let (qθ,fθ) denote the equilibrium action of a candidate with type θ ∈ {L,H}. Our equilibrium
concept dictates that in any separating equilibrium low type candidates do nothing ((qL,fL) =
(0,0)), as expending eﬀort will not help them gain oﬃce, and they dislike it. High types set
their levels of policy and fundraising to minimize costs while preventing imitation by low-type




s.t. c(qH,fH|L) ≥ x
The continuity of cost functions implies the constraint must bind. Since c(q,f|H) is continuous
and Assumption 1 guarantees that {q,f : c(q,f|L) = x} is a compact set, the minimum exists and
is obtained. The solution is most easily seen graphically. Figures 1.a - 1.g show candidate’s isocost
16Equilibrium here is as in Deﬁnition 1. We restrict to Markov Perfect equilibrium only in the repeated game.
7curves. Points up and to the right are more costly. The thick curve is a low type’s isocosts for
c(q,f|L) = x. The solution lies on this curve. The thinner curves are the isocost curves belonging
to a high type - whose objective is to ﬁnd the cheapest of her curves that touches the thick one.
Figures 1.a and 1.b show cases where a high type’s problem has a unique interior solution.
This occurs when c(q,f|H) is “more convex” than c(q,f|L).17 Figure 1.a illustrates a case where
both cost functions are symmetric in q and f. Figure 1.b shows when the two types have diﬀerent
relative trade-oﬀs between f and q, the solution will be unique and interior with qH 6= fH. Figures
1.c and 1.d show cases where c(q,f|H) is “no more convex” than c(q,f|L), but the two functions
have diﬀerent trade-oﬀs between f and q. This leads to a corner solution. In these ﬁgures, a
high type’s trade-oﬀ favors fundraising and policymaking, respectively, so a high type signals only
through these channels. Figure 1.e shows that when a low type and a high type have the same
isocost curves (varying only by the values attached to those curves), any point on the thick curve
is a solution. Figure 1.f shows that a point of tangency is not always a solution.
When the cost functions are diﬀerentiable we can use the well-known techniques of producer
theory to ﬁnd interior solutions. By writing down a high type’s Lagrangian and solving we obtain

















This condition states that the ratio of marginal costs for both types must be the same at any
interior solution. Suppose this were not true and the right side of (3) was greater than the left.
Then a high type could divert a bit of her eﬀort from q to f, which would both decrease her total
cost of eﬀort and make it no easier for a low type to imitate her. This is an improvement for a
high type, and hence the original allocation was not optimal. Notice that (2) may have a corner
solution as in Figures 1.d and 1.e, or a boundary may provide the minimum even when (3) has a
solution, as in Figure 1.f.
17The term “more convex” is used informally only. A suﬃcient condition to ensure that any point of tangency







9To complete the equilibrium analysis, we need to verify that a high type wants to separate. This
fact is immediate from Assumption 2. Any solution (qH,fH) lies on the curve {q,f : c(q,f|L) = x}.
Assumption 2 implies then that any solution must also lie on a curve {q,f : c(q,f|H) = c} for
some c < x. Since any candidate, regardless of type, gains x from being perceived as a high type
instead of a low type, separation is worth the cost to a high type.
Proposition 1 In the one-shot game, all equilibria are separating with low types choosing (qL,fL) =
(0,0) and high types choosing a solution to (2). A symmetric equilibrium always exists, and it is
the unique equilibrium if and only if there is a unique solution to (2).
All proofs are in the appendix. In the proof we construct and verify the set of equilibria
described above. The intuitive criterion and Assumption 2 rule out pooling equilibria. Finally,
our equilibrium concept eliminates any other separating equilibrium. If (2) has multiple solutions,
there are multiple equilibria: some symmetric, some not. In any equilibrium, low types of both
candidates do nothing, voters believe a candidate is a high type if and only if she chooses a (q,f)
pair such that c(q,f|L) ≥ x. Voters select high types over low types and select either candidate
with equal probability if they are believed to be the same type. High-ability candidates choose any
solution to (2), be their choices the same or not. For simplicity, we focus on symmetric equilibria.
This is weaker than assuming that (2) has a unique solution.
3.2 Campaign Finance Reform
There are many proposals regarding campaign ﬁnance reform. They range from banning outright
the raising and spending of campaign funds, to completely deregulating the sources and uses of
funds. In common parlance campaign ﬁnance reform is used to refer to additional restrictions
on campaign fundraising and spending. A proposal endorsed by many advocates for reform is to
publicly fund elections after a candidate raises a small amount of money, say b f ≥ 0, to signal that
she is a serious candidate.18
18In the United States, spending by a candidate on elections is considered protected speech under the First
Amendment, so it is not possible to prevent candidates from spending as much money as they would like on their
10We model campaign ﬁnance reform in exactly this manner. The only funds with signaling
value are those raised below the threshold b f, since all other funds are given exogenously at no
cost to a candidate. We ﬁrst analyze the game under full reform, b f = 0. As always, low-ability




s.t. c(qH,0|L) ≥ x
The solution is {qH : c(qH,0|L) = x}, which is unique. Assumption 2 still guarantees that
separation is worth its cost to a high type.
In the games depicted by Figures 1.a - 1.c, a high type must relocate to her isocost curve that
touches the thick curve right at its q-intercept. This is a more costly action for a high type to
undertake than her action without reform. In Figure 1.e, however, this relocation is equally costly
to any of the solutions under no reform. The reason is that when the two types have the same
curves, all that matters is how much cost was incurred to separate - regardless of how that cost was
incurred. The problem becomes unidimensional, and thus there is no loss to a high type. Figure
1.d shows a corner solution when a high type’s trade-oﬀ is more favorable toward policymaking
than is a low type’s. This leads to the corner solution of signaling solely through policymaking
even without reform. Hence, reform will not alter anything here.
Of course, reform need not be full (b f = 0) to be meaningful. Conversely, as Figures 1.d and
1.e show, full reform need not be meaningful. We formalize this in the deﬁnition below. Consider
an equilibrium, of which there can be many, of a game without reform where a high type selects
a pair (qH,fH). For a given election game and equilibrium level fH:
Deﬁnition 2 Reform b f is meaningful if b f < fH. Reform b f is meaningless if b f ≥ fH. 19
campaigns. The matching funds proposals alluded to above are designed such that if any candidate chooses to raise
and spend more that the initial amount, public funds are either removed from the oﬀending candidate or more are
given to the other candidate such that they both have equal funds. In the context of our model these additional
funds would be costly to raise and have no signaling value so no candidate would choose to exceed the cap. See
Ansolabehere et al. (2003) for an in-depth discussion of campaign ﬁnance and reform.
19Under this model, reducing the cap on individual or Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions to can-
11Figure 2: Meaningful Campaign Finance Reform Increases Quality of Policy.
Consider the cost structure in Figure 2, which is the same as Figure 1.a with meaningful reform.
There is only one equilibrium in Figure 1.a, and hence only one fH to worry about. If b f is set
at or above fH the game is unaﬀected. If b f is set below fH, the reformed game has a unique
equilibrium where high types select (e qH, b f), satisfying c(e qH, b f|L) = x. It is clear from the ﬁgure
that as b f is lowered, the quality of policy chosen by a high type increases. Greater reform leads
to better policymaking.
Notice that a level of reform b f can be meaningful for some equilibria and meaningless for other
equilibria of the same game. Therefore, when considering a reform, it is important to know which
equilibrium is expected to be played. Henceforth we consider only meaningful reform.
3.3 Comparison
Since all equilibria considered here (both with and without reform) are separating, an elected
oﬃcial is always of the highest ability available in her election. Reform does not lead to an
increase in the (expected) quality of the elected politician. Therefore, utility in the second period
didates does not fall under our rubric of meaningful vs. meaningless reform. By changing the cost of raising funds,
restrictions on PAC giving changes the structure of the game rather than constraining its play. By expanding the
number of actions and types and appropriately choosing cost functions our model can yield equilibrium results
similar to the empirical observations in Prat et al. (2005). Our model thus can be useful in evaluating the impact
of laws that restrict campaign giving and sources.
12is the same with or without reform for all players.
The diﬀerence under reform comes from increasing the (expected) quality of the policy made
in the ﬁrst period. If the incumbent is a high type, any meaningful reform will increase her level
of q in the ﬁrst period. This is costly to her, but beneﬁcial to voters. If the incumbent is a low
type, reform will not matter; she does nothing in either case. Further, if challengers are high-
ability politicians in other government posts, their selection of e qH under reform in the ﬁrst period
increases the utility of the constituency of that position.
4 Repeated Elections
4.1 No Campaign Finance Reform
We now return to the repeated elections model and dispense with the direct beneﬁt to voters of
having a high-type candidate in oﬃce (again: vt = qt). We ﬁnd the set of symmetric Markov
Perfect equilibria where, in each election, low types do nothing and high types separate as cheaply
as possible. Further, voters always vote for high types over low types and vote for either candidate
with equal probability in elections between candidates of the same type. For expositional clarity it
is useful to deﬁne T(x), the minimum cost to a high type of preventing imitation when low types
gain x from imitation.




s.t. c(qH,fH|L) ≥ x
The T function is found in exactly the same manner as in the one-shot model. Recall that xθ
is deﬁned as the incremental gain of being perceived as a high type relative to a low type, not
taking costs into account. However, in the one-shot election xθ was common for both types, and it
13was a simple change in probability that we could calculate before investigating the actions of each
type. With an inﬁnite horizon, xθ is diﬀerent for diﬀerent types and endogenous to the system.
Proposition 2 In all Markov Perfect equilibria of the repeated game low types choose (qL,fL) =
(0,0) and high types separate as cheaply as possible every period. A symmetric separating Markov
Perfect equilibrium always exists.
The equilibria are virtually identical to repetitions of the equilibria in the single election model.
In each period, as required by our equilibrium concept, low types do nothing and high types
diﬀerentiate themselves as cheaply as possible. Voters select high types over low types because
high types have at least as great a chance as low types of being a high type in the next period.
4.2 Campaign Finance Reform
Again, campaign ﬁnance reform is a limit, b f, to the amount candidates can signal through fundrais-
ing in each period. We argue that reform will lead to an increase in the equilibrium level of policy
chosen by high-type candidates each period. In the one-shot game, such a claim was straightfor-
ward to show. In the repeated election setting it is no longer so clear. Let T be the value function
without reform and e T be the value function with reform. Since reform restricts what high types
can do, it must be that e T(x) ≥ T(x) for all x.
Recall that xL is a low type’s gain from imitating a high type. We saw above that xL depends
on the value of the possibility of being re-elected, ρ(L). Since a low type might become a high
type in a subsequent period, ρ(L) depends on what a high type will expend in subsequent periods,
T(xL). If high types must expend more to diﬀerentiate themselves, it is not worth as much to
low types to imitate them. However, if the gain of a low type to being seen as a high type goes
down, high types need not work as hard to diﬀerentiate themselves: decreasing xL slackens the
constraint. Hence, instituting reform has two eﬀects working in opposite directions. It raises the
cost of achieving separation for any given xL, but it lowers the equilibrium level of xL.
14Figure 3: The Post Reform Equilibrium is in the Shaded Region.
Proposition 3 Meaningful Campaign Finance Reform leads to an increase in the equilibrium level
of policy chosen by high type candidates.
A graph is helpful to understand the intuition of the proof. Figure 3 depicts the same isocosts
as Figure 1.a and Figure 2. The bold curve represents the isocost c(q,f|L) = x, where x is the level
of xL in the repeated game without reform. The thin curve represents the isocost c(q,f|H) = T(x),
and qH is the equilibrium level of q chosen by a high type in the game without reform. Reform
then caps fundraising at b f. Let e x be the level of xL in the repeated game with this reform.
What will a high type’s new equilibrium action (e qH, e fH) be? Obviously, fundraising will be at
or below b f. There are three potential regions for the solution to lie in: points on or inside the
high type’s isocost curve (c(e qH, e fH|H) ≤ T(x)), points on or outside the low type’s isocost curve
(c(e qH, e fH|L) ≥ x), or points in the shaded region between the two isocosts (c(e qH, e fH|H) > T(x)
and c(e qH, e fH|L) < x). The new solution must lie in this shaded region.
Suppose that at the new solution c(e qH, e fH|L) ≥ x. Then after reform a low type is willing to
pay at least as much to imitate a high type as under no reform (e x ≥ x). But high types are paying
strictly more to separate themselves (e T(e x) > T(x)). However, if high types are paying more to
15separate, it is less proﬁtable for low types to imitate them. This means that low types are willing
to pay at least as much for something that is worth strictly less, an obvious contradiction.
Suppose that at the new solution c(e qH, e fH|H) ≤ T(x). Then after reform high types are paying
no more to separate themselves than without reform (e T(e x) ≤ T(x)). But a low type is willing to
pay strictly less to imitate a high type (e x < x). However, if high types are paying no more to
separate, it is at least as proﬁtable for low types to imitate them. This means that low types are
willing to pay strictly less for something that is worth at least as much, also a contradiction.
In the shaded region high types pay more to separate and low types are willing to pay less to
imitate high types. Thus e qH, the level of policy a high type enacts after reform, must be greater
than qH, the level without reform. In fact, e qH > q where q satisﬁes c(q, b f|L) = x, implying
e qH > q > qH. Thus, for any meaningful reform we can give a lower bound on the necessary
increase in qH, and this bound is strictly larger than zero. This, along with the discussion in
Section 3.3, allows us to establish our central result:
Theorem 1 Meaningful campaign ﬁnance reform increases voter welfare and decreases the welfare
of high-ability politicians.
4.3 Can Voters do Better?
How can it be that voters care only about the quality of policy, but from their perspective even
high-ability politicians perpetually oﬀer too little quality policy and too much fundraising? The
answer lies in the dual role of quality policy and voters’ failure to commit to vote on past perfor-
mance rather than future expectations. When casting his vote, a rational voter cares only about
the expected level of policy to be provided by the winning candidate: q-tomorrow. To a candidate,
policy (q-today) is only a way to signal her ability. Every period high-ability politicians in oﬃce
signal in the cheapest way that will guarantee separation. All players know that whomever is
elected, the pattern will start anew. Signaling through fundraising amounts to a vicious cycle
from which voters cannot escape.
16Voters would gain from the ability to reward or punish politicians that provide high or low
quality policy with promises of a high or low probability of re-election. There are two ways, both
of which our model disallows, to make such promises credible in a repeated game. First, we assume
that if voters receive the same continuation value from both candidates they must elect each with
equal probability. If voters broke ties according to a history dependent rule, they could squeeze
higher quality policy out of their politicians. However, as the number of types increases, the
mechanics of our model will not change, but any tie-breaking rule will have only a second-order
eﬀect on equilibrium behavior. A candidate’s sole concern will be to credibly signal her type, as
it is in our model.
Second, the Markov property rules out equilibria in which high-ability candidates are punished
for not providing more q than required for least-cost separation. To support repeated game
equilibria of this sort voters must face punishment, for example by moving to a lower payoﬀ
equilibrium, if they fail to punish a deviating candidate. This punishment must be either self-
induced, which lacks credibility, or requires signiﬁcant coordination between candidates. However,
if candidates are able to coordinate a move to an equilibrium that punishes voters (and therefore
beneﬁts themselves), they should do so regardless of any past play. Further, it should be noted
that equilibria of this form require that players be suﬃciently patient (δ is large enough). It is
reasonable to believe that voters will discount highly in an environment where a period is a four,
ﬁve or six-year term of oﬃce. If discounting is high enough, the Markov equilibrium we identify
is the unique equilibrium of the game.20
Campaign ﬁnance reform provides an institutional change that beneﬁts voters, though not as
much as an optimal commitment contract would. Obviously, an optimal contract will not provide
any rewards to fundraising.21 Full campaign ﬁnance reform delivers this property. However, in
general, an optimal contract will be a menu π(q) such that 1 ≥ π(qH) ≥ π(qL) ≥ 0, where
qH ≥ qL ≥ 0, but qL (and therefore π(qL)) need not, and in general will not, be equal to zero.
20This is, of course, subject to the tie-breaking considerations addressed in the previous paragraph.
21Recall from contract theory that an optimal contract is a contract that is optimal for the principle (in this
case, the electorate). In general this will diﬀer from the contract that maximizes the total surplus of all players.
17So the voters would strictly prefer an optimal contract to reform, and strictly prefer reform to no
reform.
5 Extensions
In this section we demonstrate how our model can be extended to explain many of the literature’s
stylized facts and encapsulate existing theories.
5.1 Lack of Reform
The most obvious stylized fact our model explains is why true campaign ﬁnance reform is never
implemented. No politician gains from reform. High types are worse oﬀ, and low types are
indiﬀerent. Politicians govern the rules of their own re-election contests, and therefore choose to
keep the system most favorable to them.
5.2 Incumbency Advantage
5.2.1 Selection Eﬀect
Our model also captures the well known advantage incumbents have over their challengers in re-
election races. In our model the incumbency advantage is purely a selection eﬀect.22 Let αt be the
probability an incumbent is a high type in period t. In steady state αt = αt+1 = α is deﬁned by
the probability that the winner was a high type last period multiplied by p, plus the probability
that the winner was a low type last period multiplied by p:
α = (1 − (1 − α)(1 − p))p + (1 − α)(1 − p)p
=
p(1 + p − p)
1 + (1 − p)(p − p)
∈ [p,p] (and α ∈ (p,p) when p < p)
22Gowrisankaran et al. (2006) estimate that half of the incumbency advantage in the U.S. Senate can be explained
by the selection eﬀect and the other half by deterrence of high quality challengers. For more on the incumbency
advantage see Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002).
18The probability that an incumbent wins an election is therefore:













for p < p)
Notice that the incumbency advantage obtains regardless of whether reform is instituted or not.
5.2.2 Diﬀerential fundraising
Incumbents will raise more campaign funds than their challengers for two reasons. One, incum-
bents are more likely to be high types. High types raise funds, and low types do not. Second, in
elections with more than two candidates a candidate’s equilibrium level of eﬀort expenditure is
strictly decreasing in her opponents’ likelihood of being high types. Thus, in elections with more
than two candidates (no matter how unlikely it is that the third candidate will win), even high
type challengers will raise less funds on average than high type incumbents since incumbents are
more likely to be high types than challengers are (α ≥ p).
5.2.3 Deterring Challengers
Epstein and Zemsky (1995) (in a theoretical study) and Levitt and Wolfram (1997) (in an empirical
study) argue that deterring high-quality challengers is an important source of the incumbency
advantage. Our model does not allow candidates the choice of whether or not to run. However,
we can employ an extension to analyze this phenomenon. Consider a type θ politician holding
government position X, which she values at uX. She may either run for re-election or challenge
the incumbent in government position Y, who was observed to be a high type last period. She
values position Y at uY. If she runs for re-election her expected utility is uXπθ(p) − c(q,f|θ). If
she runs for position Y , her expected utility is uYπθ(p)−c(q,f|θ). Thus, she will run for oﬃce Y
19if and only if:





p ≤ p implies that
πθ(p)
πθ(p) ≥ 1. So, unless the value of position Y is suﬃciently larger than the value
of position X, high-ability incumbents will deter challengers.
However, high-ability incumbents deter low-ability challengers more easily than high-ability












which means that the diﬀerence between uY and uX required for low types to challenge for position
Y is greater than the diﬀerence required for high types to challenge. However, it is reasonable
to assume that on average high types will hold more coveted oﬃces than low types. That is, we









implying high-type challengers will be deterred because they already hold reasonably valued oﬃces,
while low types will run for position Y because they hold lesser oﬃces. The assumption of values
satisfying these inequalities is equivalent to the common assumption that high types have higher
outside options than low types. Of course, low types who luck into X oﬃces will be disinclined to
challenge for Y , and high types who hold very low oﬃces will be inclined to challenge for higher
positions.
This extension raises a further issue regarding the welfare eﬀects of reform. Let us assume that
high types have higher outside options. Recall that reform decreases that value of being in oﬃce.
Hence, a reasonable ﬁrst-pass conclusion is that reform makes oﬃce less attractive, which decreases
20the number of high types who run for oﬃce. This would lower the value of p, the probability of a
challenger being a high type.23 Now, the eﬀect of reform on voter welfare is ambiguous. Reform
raises the level of quality policy high types produce, but it lowers the probability that a high type
will be in oﬃce. These forces pull in opposite directions, and thus whether voters are better or
worse oﬀ will depend on candidates’ cost functions and outside options.
5.3 Bloomberg Signaling
If we assume that challengers hold other oﬃces, they can use policymaking to signal their abilities
just as incumbents can. Suppose this were not the case. A challenger who holds no oﬃce can only
signal through fundraising. Thus, non-oﬃce-holding challengers will, in general, need to raise and
spend more funds to demonstrate they are high quality than the incumbents they run against.24
We see that our model encapsulates many ﬁndings from campaign ﬁnance and electoral politics.
This framework could be used to discuss political phenomena that are not obviously connected to
campaign ﬁnance, such as the explosion of pork in recent years (see, for example, Evans (2004)).
If we posit that pork has value in signaling a candidate’s ability (which it certainly does) and that
there has been a shock to the relative costs of signaling through campaign ﬁnance or pork, this
would produce results qualitatively similar to what has been observed in recent years.
6 Conclusion
We have investigated a model in which campaign fundraising is a purely a signaling activity.
Even though campaign contributions are not buying political favors, we still ﬁnd that voters will
beneﬁt from campaign ﬁnance reform, while successful politicians will oppose it. There is a simple
23If the values of outside options are independent of the number of potential candidates taking them, then p will
either decrease to zero or be unchanged. If the values of outside options are decreasing in the number of potential
candidates that take them, then p can decrease, but remain positive. Take the latter to be the case.
24For example, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and New Jersey Senator and now Governor John
Corzine. Note that throughout we have not distinguished between raising and spending funds. It is not enough to
have money, a candidate must spend it on their campaign.
21intuition behind the result, which is more general than this single application. When senders have
multiple signaling channels at their disposal, and receivers cannot credibly commit to ignoring any
of these channels, senders will use the least costly signals to reveal their types - even if receivers
would prefer diﬀerent signals were used. Further, even if senders only use channels preferable to
receivers, receivers cannot credibly commit to respond in pre-speciﬁed ways. Policies that restrict
signaling channels that are less preferable to receivers can partially substitute for commitment
mechanisms, improving receiver welfare at the expense of senders.
22Appendix
Proposition 1 In the one-shot game, all equilibria are separating with low types choosing (qL,fL) =
(0,0) and high types choosing a solution to (2). A symmetric equilibrium always exists, and is the
unique equilibrium if and only if there is a unique solution to (2).
Proof. First, we construct equilibria where candidates play as prescribed. Let (qθ,fθ) denote
the action chosen by a candidate with type θ ∈ {L,H}, and µ(q,f) denote the probability voters
assign to a candidate being an H type given her action (q,f). Let µ(q,f) = 1 if c(q,f|L) ≥ x,
and µ(q,f) = 0 otherwise. Given (qL,fL) = (0,0) and (qH,fH) is a solution to (2), the proposed
beliefs are consistent with candidates’ actions and our equilibrium deﬁnition. If µi > µj, voters
select candidate i. If µi = µj, voters select either candidate with probability 1
2. Voter behavior
is clearly optimal given their beliefs. Since the solution to (2) exists, an H type’s action is
well speciﬁed. Fix one candidate playing as prescribed, and consider deviations by the other
candidate. µ(qH,fH) = 1 implies an H type cannot gain by deviating to any (q,f) such that
c(q,f|H) ≥ c(qH,fH|H). By (qH,fH) a solution to (2), a deviation to any (q,f) such that
c(q,f|H) < c(qH,fH|H) results in µ(q,f) = 0. c(qH,fH|L) = x and Assumption 2 guarantee that
this cannot be optimal. If an L type deviates to a (q,f) such that 0 < c(q,f|L) < x, she will be
strictly worse oﬀ since µ(0,0) = µ(q,f) = 0, but her costs have increased. If she deviates to a
(q,f) such that c(q,f|L) ≥ x then µ(q,f) = 1. She is no better oﬀ since x is exactly the utility
gain of moving from µ = 0 to µ = 1. This completes the construction.
We show that pooling is impossible by contradiction. Consider a potential equilibrium in which
the two types of candidate i pool: each plays (qp,fp) with positive probability, and i wins with
probability αi
p when she plays (qp,fp). Let αi
H be the probability i wins if she is believed to be





H (or both) must
hold. Assume αi
p < αi
H. Consider µ(q0,f0) for a (q0,f0) such that (q0,f0) ≥ (qp,fp) and
c(q
0,f




H may be diﬀerent from πH since we have not assumed that candidate j is using a separating strategy.
23A (q0,f0) pair that satisﬁes this property is worse for an L type and better for an H type than
(qp,fp) if µ(q0,f0) = 1. The intuitive criterion mandates that µ(q0,f0) = 1 for any such (q0,f0).
Assumption 2 and continuity of the cost functions ensure such a pair exists. Hence, an H type
has a proﬁtable deviation and there cannot be pooling in equilibrium.
Since neither candidate’s types can pool, both candidates’ types will be revealed preceding the
election. Voters select candidates based only on their revealed types. If candidate i knows that
candidate j’s type will be revealed, i’s problem is equivalent to a standard single-sender signaling
game with herself as the sender, and pj as a payoﬀ parameter. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) show
that in this setting the set of all possible equilibria is the set constructed in this proof. If (2) has
a unique solution, this set is singleton and both candidates must use the same strategy. 
Proposition 2 In all Markov Perfect equilibria of the repeated game low types choose (qL,fL) =
(0,0) and high types separate as cheaply as possible every period. A symmetric separating Markov
Perfect equilibrium always exists.
Proof. The set of symmetric Markov Perfect equilibria where in each election (qL,fL) = (0,0),
H types separate as cheaply as possible, voters always vote for H types over L types and vote for
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1 + pV (H|p) + (1 − p)V (L|p)

− xL (IC.6)
24Equations (V.1) through (V.4) are standard dynamic programming value functions. V (θ|p) is
the value of being type θ and facing an opponent who is an H type with probability p. xL and xL
are the costs L types would have to incur to successfully imitate H types when facing opponents
with priors p and p respectively. Equations (IC.5) and (IC.6) are the binding IC constraints. From
Section 2, we know that the T function is well deﬁned. Solving the system gives that xL = xL
and yields a speciﬁc value for this term.26
We proceed by construction. Since the equilibrium is stationary, we specify play and beliefs
for a single arbitrary time period. Consider the play of a candidate facing an opponent who plays
as prescribed and has prior p. In equilibrium (qL,fL) = (0,0), H types choose a pair satisfying:
c(qH,fH|H) = T(xL) and c(qH,fH|L) = xL. Voters’ beliefs are µ(q,f) = 1 if c(q,f|L) ≥ xL, and
µ(q,f) = 0 otherwise. These beliefs are correct given the candidates’ strategies. Voters then select
H types over L types and select either candidate with equal probability if they are equally likely
to be H types. By stationarity, voters know that an L type in oﬃce next period will set qL = 0,
but an H type will set qH ≥ 0. Voters at least weakly prefer an H type to be in oﬃce. However, in
the next period a candidate may no longer be the same type she revealed this period. By p ≥ p, an
H type is at least as likely to be an H type again as an L type is become an H type. Thus, voters
prefer to select candidates they perceive to be H types before the election. The speciﬁed voting
behavior is optimal given beliefs. µ(qH,fH) = 1 implies H types cannot gain from deviating to
any (q,f) such that c(q,f|H) ≥ c(qH,fH|H). By c(qH,fH|H) = T(xL) and c(qH,fH|L) = xL, a
deviation to any (q,f) such that c(q,f|H) < c(qH,fH|H) results in µ(q,f) = 0. Since H types
value oﬃce at least as much as L types (xH ≥ xL), and L types are indiﬀerent between imitating
H types or not (equation (IC.5)), Assumption 2 guarantees that being perceived as an L type
cannot be optimal for an H type. If an L type deviates to a (q,f) such that 0 < c(q,f|L) < xL,
she will be strictly worse oﬀ since µ(0,0) = µ(q,f) = 0 but her costs have increased. If she
deviates to a to a (q,f) such that c(q,f|L) ≥ xL then µ(q,f) = 1. She is no better oﬀ since xL
is exactly the utility gain of moving from µ = 0 to µ = 1. Everything is analogous for candidates
26As in the one-shot game, xL is constant with respect to the opponent’s priors p ∈ (0,1), hence xL = xL. In
richer settings this will not be the case.
25facing opponents with prior p, using T(xL) and xL in place of T(xL) and xL. Pooling and other
separating equilibria are ruled out by the same arguments given in the proof of Proposition 1. 
Proposition 3 Meaningful Campaign Finance Reform leads to an increase in the equilibrium level
of policy chosen by high type candidates.
Proof. Solving the system of equations (V.1) through (IC.6) yields:
xL = xL =
2δ − 2T(xL)pδ + 2pδ2 − 2pδ2 + ppδ2 − p2δ2






(4 − 2δ) + (p − 2)(p − p)(2δ + δ2(p − 1))
< 0 (A.8)
To see that (A.8) is negative note that the numerator is negative. Also: (4 − 2δ) > 0, (p−2) < 0,
(p−p) > 0, and (2δ+δ2(p−1)) > 0. The ﬁrst term in the denominator is positive and the second
is negative. The ﬁrst term is minimized at δ = 1, and the second term is minimized (i.e. made
maximally negative) at δ = 1, p = 0, p = 1. At these parameter values, the denominator is zero.
Hence, the denominator is positive for all δ in [0,1] and p ≤ p both in (0,1).
Let x be the level of xL prior to reform, and e x be its level after reform is implemented.
From the text we know e T(x) ≥ T(x) for all x. Let e qH and e fH be the post reform levels of
q and f selected by an H type. Assume, by way of contradiction, that e T(e x) < T(x). By T
and e T non-decreasing and e T ≥ T, e T(e x) < T(x) implies x > e x. But this contradicts (A.8).
Hence, the amount a high type is willing to pay for separation must not decrease following reform:
e T(e x) ≥ T(x). Since c(q,f|H) is strictly increasing, and the no reform level of fundraising was
fH > e fH, e T(e x) = c(e qH, e fH|H) ≥ c(qH,fH|H) = T(x) implies e qH > qH. 
Theorem 1 Meaningful campaign ﬁnance reform increases voter welfare and decreases the welfare
of high-ability politicians.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the previous proposition and the discussion in Section
3.3. 
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